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Chakravarti v Advertiser
Newspapers: lessons for
journalists
Rhonda Breit
The lower courts are now interpreting the High Courts
judgement in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd, which was
handed down in May 1998. As the lower courts grapple with the
decision, journalists must still produce reports of complex legal
matters. Unfortunately for Australian journalists, the Chakravarti
decision has done little to clarify the uncertainty surrounding
defamation law. In fact, the decision can be criticised for increasing
that uncertainty. This article examines the effect of the Chakravarti
case on journalism by analysing the text of the various
judgements and:
 extracting the legal principles which bind journalists;
 identifying areas where the persuasive opinion of judges may
create an environment of uncertainty for journalists; and
 discussing ways of maximising privilege protection when
reporting matters of public interest.

F

reedom of speech and a persons right to protect their good
name are fundamental human rights. When the two collide and
a persons reputation is harmed in the name of freedom of
speech, very often it is the media who pay: they pay out large sums in
damages but the greater cost is the curtailment of freedom of
expression. This has resulted in many journalists believing that
defamation is a major impediment to freedom of speech and
investigative journalism (Schultz 1998: 163). The High Courts decision
in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd suggests the tort of defamation
could also be a major impediment to reporting complex court matters,
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which have traditionally been viewed as protected reports (Eisenberg
1998, 10). The non-binding observations made by the various judges,
when handing down their judgement in this case, increases rather than
removes the uncertainty of the tort of defamation, which aims to
balance freedom of speech and the right of the individual to protect
their reputation. This balance is achieved by outlawing the publication
of material, which has a tendency to injure a persons reputation, but
allowing a defendant to defend the publication by:
 denying the publication is defamatory; or
 accepting that the publication is defamatory but avoiding liability
because the publication is true, fair comment or privileged.
Privilege is seen as a strong defence, giving complete immunity to
some publications. The decision in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers
Ltd suggests, however, that journalists must be careful when relying
on the qualified privilege of a fair and accurate report of protected
proceedings. This is particularly the case where the proceedings are
complicated and confusing (Eisenberg 1998: 10). This article examines
the legal and practical implications of the Chakravarti Case for journalists.
Before embarking on this analysis however, it is important to consider
the facts of the case.

The facts
The case arose from two articles published in the Adelaide Advertiser
reporting on the Royal Commission, set up in March 1991, to
investigate the near collapse of the South Australian State Bank. The
plaintiff was Mandobendro Chakravarti, the executive director of
Beneficial Finance Corporations Australian (BFC) business division.
BFC was a wholly owned subsidiary of the State Bank of South
Australia. Chakravarti sued the proprietors of The Advertiser over two
separate publications, which he claimed damaged his reputation. Both
articles were based on evidence given to the Royal Commission. The
first article dealt with the oral evidence of David Simmons, a former
chairman of the banks board and BFC. He gave evidence about a
meeting with the SA Premier in which the resignations of BFC directors
were discussed. The article was headlined Bannon accused on
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resignations and included a photograph of four officers of BFC
mentioned in the article, including Chakravarti. The first article related
to evidence produced at the Royal Commission about the real reason
for BFC executives resigning. It referred to all four executives together
suggesting that Chakravarti was:
 one of the directors who had been forced to resign from BFC;
 involved in criminal or civil misconduct;
 involved in some dubious activity relating to a Melbourne
Joint Venture which was not explained in the evidence (see
Chakravarti 1998, 331).1
Chakravarti claimed the article was not a true and accurate record
of the proceedings, creating a false inference of him being involved
in civil or criminal conduct and conducting himself in an improper
manner as a director of BFC. He ordered a copy of the proceedings
transcript, which indicated that The Advertiser had inaccurately recorded
a response from the witness quoted. Based on this, Mr Chakravarti
wrote a letter seeking an apology and correction from The Advertiser.
No apology or correction was published. It was later revealed that
the transcript had been incorrect and the reporters version of the
evidence was correct. However, the court had to consider whether
the report, as a whole, was inaccurate or unfair.
The second article ted to a file note prepared by Simmons. The
headline on page one read: Loans may be criminal: bank chief s diaries.
The story continued on page two under the headline Loans may be
criminal  diaries. It included a graphic described as an excerpt
from Mr Simmonss diaries. It read: Preliminary audit reveals Baker,
Reichart (sic), Chakravarti and Martin have all loans which were not
approved and were not authorised and are in excess of agreed benefits
. . . May be criminal rather than civic (sic).2
Chakravarti claimed the second article inaccurately represented what
went on in the proceedings and gave rise to false imputations,
suggesting:
 he was engaged in criminal or civil misconduct in connection
with loans;
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 he was a party to a conspiracy;
 he received unapproved and excessive benefits which at the
least amounted to civil misconduct;
 he had been involved in an illicit joint venture; and
 he was not a trustworthy person or executive (Chakravarti 1998,
333).

The action first came before a e w i t h o u t a j u ry, who found the
articles conveyed the defamatory meaning pleaded by the plaintiff.
The defendant failed to convince the judge that the report was
protected as a fair and accurate of the Royal Commission Proceedings.
The plaintiff was awarded $268,000 damages. The respondent
appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia,
where the majority of the court found that the first article did not
convey the defamatory meaning pleaded by the plaintiff. The second
article was found to have contained defamatory statements but the
damages could relate only to parts of the article that failed to fairly
report the commission (Kenyon 1999: 12). The plaintiff s damages
were reduced to $40,000. Chakravarti appealed to the High Court on
three broad issues (Kenyon 1999: 12). They were:
1. Were the imputations pleaded defamatory? (Kenyon 1999: 12)
2. Was the report protected by fair report privilege under section
7 Wrongs Act or at common law? (Kenyon 1999: 12)
3. Was the quantum of damages appropriate? (Kenyon 1999: 12)
The legal findings of the High Court do not alter the general
principles about the tort of defamation and the availability of the
defence of fair report privilege. This case is important because of the
observations made in the various judgements on how these principles
should be applied to the facts of a case. Each of the three judgements
delivered provides a different interpretation on how these principles
apply to media publications. This lack of consensus between the judges
of the High Court increases the uncertainty surrounding the application
of the tort of defamation and may result in some journalists censoring
complex stories. To assist journalists reporting legal and quasi-judicial
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proceedings, this article will identify the areas of uncertainty and give
some practical guidelines on how to avoid legal problems. First, it is
important to extract the legal principles from the case.

The High Courts findings
All five judges agreed on the final outcome of the case. Gummow
J and Gaudron J delivered the leading judgement, upholding the
appeal from the Full Court of South Australia which reduced damages
from $268,000 to $40,000 and sending the matter back to the Full
Court to reassess damages (Chakravarti 1998: 325, 326). Brennan CJ
and McHugh J delivered a separate judgement, agreeing with the leading
judgement with the exception of two matters. Kirby agreed with the
outcome of the remainder of the court but he made some general
observations about the tort of defamation. While some of the issues
arising from this case are not binding precedent, the judges
observations are important, settling some principles of defamation
law while adding to the uncertainty of others.
A majority of the court agreed that the tribunal of fact must first
determine whether the imputations pleaded are defamatory and then
decide whether the report is protected by privilege (Chakravarti 1998:
297, 334). Gummow J and Gaudron J dissented from the remaining
judges on this matter, claiming that the court must first consider whether
the report is fair and accurate and then decide whether the imputations
were defamatory (Chakravarti 1998: 306).
A majority found the defence of fair report privilege must be
applied to the whole publication, not the specific imputations pleaded.
This means that if a part of the report is inaccurate or unfair, then the
whole publication may lose its privilege protection. (Chakravarti 1998:
322, 359)
It was also agreed that to attract privilege protection under the fair
report privilege an article must:
 be a report, in that it must not carry commentary;
 it must be accurate; and
 it must be fair.
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The tests for fairness and accuracy are linked. The report must be
substantially accurate and a substantial inaccuracy in the text of an
article, which goes to the reputation of the person claiming damage
to their reputation, will render the report unfair. The test for a
substantial inaccuracy or misrepresentation is whether the publication
would substantially alter the impression that a reader would have
received had he been present at the trial. (Chakravarti 1998, 298, 309,
347).
A majority of the court (Kirby dissenting) found that the common
law privilege protection applies in addition to section 7 Wrongs Act
(Chakravarti 1998: 321-322).
Based on the decision in Chakravarti, an article summarising the
evidence delivered to a Royal Commission (or other judicial or quasijudicial proceedings) will only attract privilege protection in these
circumstances:
1. The article is a fair and accurate report of the proceedings.
2. The article is limited to the evidence presented at the proceedings
and not littered with commentary and the journalists opinion.
3. The report conveys to the ordinary reader the impression of
being present at the proceedings. Any substantially inaccurate
impression renders the publication inaccurate and unfair.
4. The whole publication must be substantially accurate and fair:
if it is found that the report contains a substantial inaccuracy or
is substantially unfair, the whole report loses its protection and
the plaintiff is entitled to recover on all defamatory imputations
contained in the report.
These findings have been adopted in at least one case since the
High Court handed down its decision (Warren 1999: 2). However,
the damage for journalists is in the detail of the three judgements,
most notably in these areas:
 How the courts interpret the meaning of words.
 Reporting suspicion of guilt.
 The limitations of the privilege available to fair and accurate
reports.
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 The effect of apologies on a fair and accurate report.

The meaning of words
A majority of the High Court found that where the defendant
seeks to avoid liability by relying on a defence (as opposed to denying
the publication is defamatory), the court must first determine whether
the imputations complained of by the plaintiff are in fact defamatory
(Chakravarti 1998: 287, 334). This means the court must decide what
the words mean, before considering whether a report is fair and
accurate. This is a logical starting point, because the defence only comes
into play if the words are defamatory.
The judges went on to make a number of observations about
how words are to be interpreted. First, all five judges agreed (with
slight variations) that, at common law, a plaintiff is not limited to the
meanings pleaded if the imputations conveyed are less serious than
those pleaded (Chakravarti 1998: 302-4, 313, 340-1)3. m ase the court
acknowledged the need for flexibility if conveyed meanings do not
correspond exactly with the pleaded meaning (Kenyon 1999: 130),
two judges rejected a similar flexibility for defendants.
In Australia it has been accepted that where a publication contains
a number of defamatory statements which in their context may have
a common sting then the defendant is entitled to justify the sting
(in Chakravarti 1998: 299). This has become known as the Polly Peck
defence, which has been accepted in English and Australian courts
since the mid-1980s (Kenyon 1999: 13). Brennan and McHugh have
now cast doubt on that practice, stating such approach is contrary to
the basic rules of common law pleadings (Chakravarti 1998: 299).
They went on to say:
A plea of justification, fair comment or qualified privilege in respect of an
imputation not pleaded by the plaintiff does not plead a good defence. It
is immaterial that the defendant can justify or otherwise defend the meaning
which it attributes to the publication. In our view, the Polly Peck defence or
practice contravenes the basic principles of common law pleadings. In general
it raises a false issue which can only embarrass the fair trial of the actions
(Chakravarti 1998: 299).
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While the other judges did not endorse these findings, the Polly
Peck defence, which gives some latitude to defamation defendants, is
now clouded in uncertainty. This issue was raised in the Supreme Court
of the Australian Capital Territory in November 1999. Crispin J noted
the statements of Brennan and McHugh about the availability of the
Polly Peck defence and said that while he shared the misgivings which
their Honours expressed he did not have to decide whether Polly
Peck (Holdings) v Telford & Ors should be followed ( Steiner Wilson
& Webster Pty Ltd t/as Abbey Bridal v Amalgamated Television
Services Pty Ltd 1999, par 199). If other courts do accept the reasoning
of Brennan CJ and McHugh J (which it appears they might), the media
will have to be more cautious when asserting the truth of publications
and ensure they can prove the truth of all imputations pleaded.
The majority of the judges supported a more liberal approach to
the pleading requirements for plaintiffs. This means it will be easier
for plaintiffs to establish their case, provided the pleading covers the
imputations they prove. However, if the Brennan CJ and McHugh J
approach to the Polly Peck defence is accepted then defendants (who
are frequently media organisations) will have to prove the truth of all
imputations and not just the common sting. The judgement appears
to have made it easier for plaintiffs to establish a defamation action
thus making it harder for defendants to deny the defamatory nature
of a publication. At the same time it is going to be harder for
defendants to avoid liability by admitting the defamatory nature of a
publication but justifying it because the defamatory imputations are
true.
Kirby J (who delivered a separate judgement) did not consider the
Polly Peck defence, but his reasoning on the interpretation of words
is of significance for a number of reasons. First he observed that the
meaning of words should be interpreted from the perspective of the
reasonable reader or ordinary man, who has a greater capacity
than a lawyer to draw inferences, particularly where the language is
loose (Chakravarti 1998, 335). He noted the ordinary person
approaches perception . . . with a greater willingness to draw inferences
and to read between the lines. He cautioned: Where words have
been used which are imprecise, ambiguous or loose, a very wide
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latitude will be ascribed to the ordinary person to draw imputations
adverse to the subject. That is the price which publishers must pay for
the use of loose language (Chakravarti 1998: 335). Therefore
journalists, and particularly headline writers, need to select their words
carefully. For example, instead of using the word diaries is the
headline of the second article, it would have been better to use note
or file. Diary suggests that what is contained in it is true. Therefore
the ordinary reader will place great weight to the information contained
in a diary, as was seen when the Abbotts and Costellos sued Random
House over allegations supposedly contained in a diary.
Kirby also made observations about how the ordinary or reasonable
person forms an opinion on the meaning of a publication. Gaudron,
Gummow, Brennan CJ and McHugh all agreed that when determining
the meaning of words, the publication must be considered as a whole.
This means that headlines, graphics and other prominent features of a
publication must be considered in context of the whole publication
(Chakravarti 1998: 316, Pearce 1998: 3).
Kirby went further than the rest of the court on this issue, stating
that when interpreting the meaning of words, account must be taken
of modern communication practices. He warned:
In a society increasingly used to the immediacy of channel surfing with
remote controls and accessing the Internet with computers, publishers must
take special care with prominently published matter. This obligation clearly
applies to headlines, captions, photographs, pictures and their digital
equivalents (Chakravarti 1998: 337).

Kirby rejected the House of Lords decision in Charleston v News
Group Newspapers Ltd, in which a defamation action by two prominent
Australian actors was unsuccessful. The actors sued over a publication,
which used photographs of their faces (without their consent) and
superimposed them on the bodies of two near naked people engaging
in pornographic acts. The court found that the publication was not
defamatory because, reading the publication as a whole, the text of
the article neutralised the harmful effect of the headline and photograph
(Charleston 1995: 456, 457). In reaching their decision, the Lords
rejected the proposition that the prominent headline . . . may found
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a claim in libel in isolation from its related text, because some readers
only read headlines ( Charleston 1995: 456; and in Chakravarti 1998:
336).
Kirby specifically rejected this approach, claiming it ignores the
realities of the way in which ordinary people receive, and are intended
to receive, communications of this kind (Chakravarti 1998: 336). In
effect, he is rejecting the bane and antidote principle, which recognises
that the harmful effect of a defamatory imputation can be neutralised
by statements of an ameliorating kind (Morosi 1980: 418n). In Morosi
v Radio Station 2GB, the court found that in deciding the impression
conveyed by a publication, the jury must ask whether the defamatory
statement is overcome by the contextual matter of an emollient kind
as to eradicate the hurt and render the publication as harmless (Morosi
1980, 419).
Kirby claims modern communication practices require a
reinterpretation of the law to recognise that headlines and prominent
features can assume a defamatory meaning of their own. Modern
communication practices can be accommodated within the common
law principles espoused by the rest of the court. If when reading a
publication as a whole the text does not neutralise the harmful effect
of the headlines, graphics etc., then the publication is defamatory.
Obviously the harmful effect of a headline, graphic or photograph
would be harder to overcome than a defamatory imputation arising
in the text of a story. Headlines, sub headings, graphics and other
prominent features will be more damaging than material of less
prominence in the text. Instead of rejecting the legal basis on which
the law lords made their decision in Charleston, Kirby should have
criticised the way they applied the bane and antidote test to the facts.
Kirbys approach is essentially making the media summarise difficult
stories into three or four words, which form a headline. This approach
would enable a plaintiff to extract prominent elements of a story
from the context in which they are published. The media would need
to consider the meaning of each prominent aspect of a publication
on two levels: first as they stand alone and then in the context of the
whole publication, where they can assume a defamatory meaning if
the reader decided to pay the publication greater attention. Thus a
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balanced story can assume a defamatory meaning because of the
harmful effect from its prominent features. Kirby notes that defamation
is not a negligence-based tort (Chakravarti 1998, 347), therefore even
the most carefully prepared publication can be defamatory if the
impression conveyed to the reader harmed an identifiable persons
reputation.
Kirbys approach skews the balance between freedom of speech
and the protection of a persons reputation too far against freedom
of speech.
The bane and antidote approach strikes a better balance between
freedom of speech and protecting a persons reputation because the
harmful effect of the story is determined by looking at the prominent
features of the story in context. The harmful effects of prominent
features of a story would have to be completely neutralised by other
features, which is obviously quite difficult to achieve. If this is done
however, the publisher should not be liable.
The practical effect of Kirbys observations is that journalists must
place considerable emphasis on headlines, graphics, photographs and
other devices used to capture audience attention when evaluating the
accuracy of a report. Their use should not distort one aspect of the
case to give a misleading impression. However, his observations
increase the uncertainty about whether the harm of a headline or other
prominent feature of an article can be overcome in the text of an
article.

Reporting suspicions or allegations
The court also considered the difficulty in balancing the public
interest in suspicions of guilt and the need to protect an individual
from accusations of guilt. There is considerable uncertainty as to when
a report of suspicion of guilt becomes elevated to an accusation of
guilt.
Kirby observed that although reporting that a person has been
arrested and charged undoubtedly occasions damage to some degree
to the reputation of that person, this must be tolerated on the basis of
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the legitimate public interest in the reporting of such facts (Chakravarti
1998: 337). He noted the mass media must report on matters of
public interest such as a Royal Commission. But the law will only
afford protection to fair and accurate reports of these proceedings
otherwise suspicion or accusation might be elevated in the publics
mind to guilt in fact (Chakravarti 1998, 337). In Chakravarti, the two
articles went further than reporting a suspicion of criminal or civil
misconduct and gave the impression that Chakravarti was guilty of
criminal or civil misconduct. The false inference of guilt arising from
the reports helped to negate their accuracy. However, the High Court
did not provide clear guidelines about when an accusation of guilt
actually imputes guilt, leaving journalists in the dark over what can be
published with safety. This issue is of relevance for two reasons: first,
because of the uncertainty surrounding when a publication imputes
guilt thus rendering it defamatory. Secondly, it is important because
the elevation of a suspicion to an imputation of guilt will affect the
fairness and accuracy of a report, and thus may limit the defences
available to justify a defamatory publication.
Based on existing law and the observations of the court in
Chakravarti, it is clear that by simply reporting the fact that charges
have been laid does not give rise to an imputation of guilt (Chakravarti
1998: 337; Flahvin 1998: 9, Mirror Newspapers v Harrison 1982:
293). In many circumstances, however, journalists argue that more
information than the basic charges is needed to satisfy the public
interest, particularly where the case involves issues of public safety or
political insight. The uncertainty surrounding when a suspicion becomes
elevated to an imputation of guilt can result in the media censoring
information of real public interest. Chakravarti does little to clarify
how much information can be included in reports relating to suspicions
of guilt before they are elevated to an imputation of guilt, and the law
is less than certain on this issue. Flahvin cites two examples that highlight
this uncertainty. In Mirror Newspapers v Harrison an action in defamation
arose from a publication, which described charges laid against a suspect,
but also carried a photograph of the victim and a description of the
detective work that had led to the arrests. The High Court in Harrison
found the article did not give rise to an imputation of guilt (Flahvin
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1998: 9). Flahvin compares this case to an unreported decision of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales, where a report was found
capable of imputing guilt because it reported that two school teachers
had  after a lengthy police investigation  been charged with sexually
assaulting students and suspended pending the hearing of the case.
(1998: 9).
Flahvin observes that while the principle in Harrison was approved
by the Supreme Court of NSW, journalists could be forgiven for
thinking that in its application it (the principle) has been rendered quite
useless (1998: 9). This uncertainty again arises from the courts apparent
inconsistent application of the principles, rather than in the principles
themselves. Where the courts are balancing rights, it is impossible to
provide a line between right and wrong. Given the threat of censorship
for fear of civil action in defamation, the court should aim to provide
clear guidelines for journalists to balance these rights when they are
providing information of public interest. However, this has not been
done, therefore journalists must rely on common sense in drawing
their own guidelines.

What is a fair and accurate report?
The court agreed that a defamatory imputation can be defended
in the public interest if it is a fair and accurate report of the proceedings.
Brennan CJ and McHugh J endorsed the test outlined in Thom v
Associated Newspapers Ltd (1964), which states:
The report need not be verbatim, but to be privileged it must accurately
express what took place. Errors may occur; but if they are such as not
substantially to alter the impression that the reader would have received had
he been present at the trial, the protection is not lost. If, however, there is a
substantial misrepresentation of a material fact prejudicial to the plaintiff s
reputation, the report must be regarded as unfair and the jury should be so
directed (Chakravarti 1998: 298).

This reasoning was supported by Gummow J and Gaudron J
who observed:
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It is well settled that a report need not be a complete report of the proceedings
in question. Nor need it be accurate in every respect. It must however, be
substantially accurate, and the question whether it is substantially accurate is
a question of fact (Chakravarti 1998: 309).

Kirby agreed with the rest of the judges stating: Where there is a
dispute whether a report is fair and accurate, that dispute must be
resolved as a factual question by comparing the relevant record of the
proceedings with the matter complained of. The test has been
expressed in terms of whether the report substantially alters the
impression which its recipients would have gained had he or she been
present during the proceedings. (Chakravarti 1998: 347).
He went on to say:
The mistakes and inaccuracy may deprive the defendant of the defence of
fair report. Of their nature, they may also contribute to the damage done to
the plaintiff s reputation. They may therefore warrant consideration in the
context to identify what it is about the matter complained of that is
defamatory of the plaintiff (Chakravarti 1998: 347).

Kirby stated the court must look at the entirety of a report to
determine its accuracy, but when considering its fairness, particular
attention will be paid to headlines, and graphics which have the object
of capturing maximum public attention (Chakravarti 1998: 347).
The relationship between fairness and accuracy was also explored
by Kirby. A report must retain substantial accuracy in all material
respects. If it contains untrue statements of a material fact, which
have the potential to damage the reputation of the person referred to,
the report will be unfair. (Chakravarti 1998: 347) A substantial
inaccuracy strips the publication of its privilege protection, exposing
the publisher to liability for all of the defamatory imputations contained
therein, even if the rest of the information is substantially accurate.
The rest of the court supported this principle (Chakravarti 1998: 347,
314). In essence the court will weigh up the inaccuracies, by comparing
the report to what was said in the proceedings, and if a substantially
inaccurate impression arises then the report is unprotected by fair report
privilege. The inaccuracy contaminates the whole report, even if the
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reporter has been extremely diligent. The loss of fair report privilege
is a serious blow to a publisher, who would have to look for some
other way of defending the publication.

Commentary can contaminate report
To be a report, a publication must accurately summarise the events.
The summary does not have to be correct in every sense, but it must
be substantially correct. Kirby noted that a commentary can
contaminate a report, thus rendering it unprotected under privilege
because it does not accurately record what is going on.
To the extent that (a publication) goes beyond a report, and the reporter
engages in comment, description and elaboration of the reporters own,
the privilege provided for a report will be inapplicable and may be lost
entirely . . . Excessive commentary or misleading headlines which amount
to commentary run the risk of depriving the text of the quality of fairness
to attract the privilege (Chakravarti 1998: 346).

Kirbys observations about commentary are important for two
reasons:
 The use of comment, description and independent elaboration
could see the report classified as a commentary and not a report
of the proceedings.
 The comments could render the publication inaccurate and
unfair even if they appear in a prominent headline.
If the commentary contaminates the fair report privilege, all is not
lost, because the publisher may be able to rely on the defence of fair
comment or political communication privilege if the issue involves
government and political matters. (Based on the High Courts
interpretation of government and political matters in Lange v Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings would
be covered). Although the Royal Commission related broadly to
political and government matters, this issue was not raised by the
defendant in Chakravarti. Both sides agreed that because it was a report
of a Royal Commission journalists were expected to ensure the report
was strictly accurate (Chakravarti 1998, 334). This raises the question
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whether the court will expand it reasonableness guidelines set out in
Lange to include a requirement that a report of judicial, legal or political
proceedings must also be fair and accurate4.
With respect to the fair comment, true facts are required to enable
the public to assess the value they will put on a persons opinion. The
defence will be lost if the facts stated are not true. The political
communication privilege recognises the publics right to take part in
the democratic process, and requires information published to be
reasonable. In some circumstances, for example reports of court and
parliament, the communication about political and government matters
may only be reasonable if they are substantially accurate. Therefore, a
journalist cannot avoid their obligation to accurately report the facts
of a legal or quasi-legal matter.

Apologies and the issue of fairness
Section 7 Wrongs Act (SA) gives an aggrieved person a right of
reply, which if refused without negotiation will be taken into account
in determining the reasonableness of the response. All five judges
considered whether the letters written by Mr Chakravarti were
reasonable thus barring The Advertiser from relying on section 7 Wrongs
Act SA to defend publication. Gaudron J and Gummow J, with whom
Brennan CJ and McHugh J agreed, concluded that the question of
reasonableness was not a live issue (Chakravarti 1998: 321; Pearce
1998: 4). Before reaching this conclusion, they found that the
reasonableness of a letter of reply is a value judgement
(Chakravarti 1998: 321).5 This does little to clarify what is a reasonable
reply, however they noted:
 Generally, it will be unreasonable for the reply to controvert
the fairness and accuracy of the report in question (Chakravarti
1998, 320; Pearce 1998, 4).
 A measured assertion of a belief , which is subsequently shown
to be incorrect, is not necessarily unreasonable (Chakravarti 1998,
320; Pearce 1998, 4).
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 The consideration of reasonableness is not limited to the facts
known at the time the letter was sent (Chakravarti 1998: 321,
Pearce 1998, 4).
These observations that provide little guidance for an editor facing
the decision of whether to publish a reply. Although these guidelines
represent the majority of the courts opinion, an editor may find Justice
Kirbys observations more helpful (and easier to understand). Pearce
suggests editors should keep a copy of Justice Kirbys guidelines handy
for ready reference (Pearce 1998, 5).
Kirby J went further than his fellow judges, suggesting that the
Wrongs Act provision must be interpreted in light of its aims and:
 For a letter to be reasonable it must be more than a mere
request for a retraction . . . letter of protest or insult
(Chakravarti 1998: 351; Pearce 1998: 5).
 The request and report must be contemporaneous (Chakravarti
1998: 351; Pearce 1998: 5).
 The response must be objectively reasonable (Chakravarti 1998:
351; Pearce 1998: 5)
 Reasonableness is objectively measured in terms of the purposes
of the provision: to correct incorrect information that has been
published (Chakravarti 1998: 351; Pearce 1998: 5).
 In determining reasonableness the court will look at the length
of the letter/statement; the terms in which it is expressed and
its ability to negate harm to a persons reputation (Chakravarti
1998: 351; Pearce 1998: 5).
 The concept of reasonableness does not include a concept
of editorial veto; but publishers are entitled to respond to the
letter by way of an editorial note (Chakravarti 1998: 351; Pearce
1998: 5).
 A refusal by an editor to negotiate about the publication of a
letter of correction can be taken into account in determining
the reasonableness of the letter (Chakravarti 1998: 352).
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This discussion suggests editors can no longer afford to refuse to
publish letters of correction or clarification, instead they should opt
to publish the letter with a note clarifying the claims of the letter writer

Effect on journalists
This discussion reveals that the Chakravarti decision does not alter
the law governing fair report privilege but it does affect the way the
law will be applied to the facts a case, raising a variety of issues for
journalists.
First, journalists have to pay particular attention when reporting
complex court matter, ensuring that any report produced is a
substantially accurate account of the proceedings. Journalistic
commentary or opinion and sensationalisation of some parts of the
report or headline or graphic could render the report inaccurate or
unfair. When considering the impression of the report, journalists
must remember modern reading practices and pay particular attention
to the harmful effects of headlines, graphics and photographs.
When writing reports, journalists should use precise language,
because loose language could give rise to more inferences.
When reporting allegations of suspicion of guilt, the reporter must
be careful not to elevate the accusations to an inference of actual guilt
by providing too much information or indicating that the suspicion
emanates from a particularly reliable source. And finally, when a person
writes a reasonable letter of clarification, then editors should think
seriously about running the letter with an explanatory editorial note.
If a report is littered with commentary, then a reporter will need
to structure the report to ensure it is protected by fair comment or the
expanded political communication privilege.

Practical steps to minimise risks
Newspapers reporting complex legal matters can take a number
of practical steps to maximise their chances of relying on the fair
report privilege.
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All court reporters should have excellent shorthand skills. Shorthand
is an underrated skill and is essential if court reporters are to ensure
their report is fair and accurate.
Any commentary about cases should be run in separate articles
based on the actual report. This will ensure that the commentary does
not contaminate the report. The report would be defensible as a fair
and accurate report of the proceedings and the commentary would
then be defended as fair comment. Any harmful imputations arising
from the commentary will be defensible provided:
 the commentary is an honest opinion;
 about a matter of public interest; and,
 the facts upon which the commentator is basing his/her opinion
are set out (by referring to the report) in the text of the
publication; and
 these facts are true or absolutely privileged, remember however,
that the test for truth and privilege brings up the issues raised in
this article: the facts must accurately and fairly reflect what was
said in the proceedings and when proving the truth of
statements, it is not enough to prove the common sting.
If the report and commentary are run in the same story, the
commentary could render the report unfair. If the report is unfair,
then it loses its privilege protection completely and the journalists and
publisher will be liable for the defamatory imputations it contains,
unless they can be defended on some other basis. But caution must
also be exercised when running stories side by side because the court
will look at the publication as a whole. If a commentary is run as a
side-bar story under a common headline, the commentary may be
regarded as a part of the whole story and run the risk of contaminating
the fair report privilege. So when laying out reports of judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings, think carefully about where commentaries
are placed.
It may be possible to defend mass reports of judicial and quasijudicial reports under the expanded duty/interest privilege recognised
to protect reports to the general public of political and government
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matters. To attract this expanded qualified privilege the report must
be reasonable and not actuated by malice. Whether a report is
reasonable is determined on the circumstances of each case, but a
publisher will not be reasonable unless:
 there were reasonable grounds for believing the imputation
was true;
 proper steps were taken to verify the accuracy of the
information;
 the imputations were not believed to be untrue; and
 a response was sought from the person defamed and the
response published wherever practicable (Lange 1997: 13).
These factors are only guidelines as to what constitutes a reasonable
publication. Given that the public only has an interest in receiving fair
and accurate reports of judicial and quasi-judicial matters, it could be
argued that to be reasonable the report would also have to be fair and
accurate. Therefore the practical issues raised by Chakravarti will still
have to be addressed.
The Lange defence also gives rise to a right of reply and highlights
the need for editors to allow people, who claimed to be defamed by
reports of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, to publish letters in
response.
When reporting judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, journalists
should use precise language and ensure all reports are balanced, paying
particular attention to prominent features because the harmful effect
in these prominent features will be harder to correct than imputations
arising in the text.
When reporting charges and suspicions of guilt, the reporter should
not include too much information about the investigative process nor
suggest the information they have published has come from an official
source. For example, it could make a difference to suggest that
information published had been included in a persons diary when in
fact it merely formed part of a file note. The ordinary person considers
that people publish the truth in diaries, so they tend to give more
weight to information contained in them.
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If a publisher cannot prove the truth of all of the imputations
arising from a publication, then they should seriously consider leaving
the information out or considering rephrasing the statement to ensure
it can be defended as fair comment or some form of privilege.

Conclusion
Fair and accurate reports of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings
are protected reports for the purposes of the tort of defamation.
Chakravarti has not removed that defence, it has just interpreted what
is a fair and accurate report. The court has sent a clear message that no
concessions will be made for the mass media who sensationalises a
report, in fact they have to assume that they are publishing to a more
inattentive audience. When publishing to this inattentive audience, which
forms its impressions from prominent features of a story, the media
must not convey a misleading impression. This suggests balance and
accuracy are the key to maintaining the fair report privilege.
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Notes
1
2

For the full text of the first article see Kirbys judgement on page 331.
For the full text of the second article see Kirbys judgement on page 332333.
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3

In New South Wales each imputation is a cause of action, therefore each
pleaded meaning must be strictly interpreted. The High Court, in Chakravarti,
has refused to adopt this practice at common law. (see Kenyon Pleading
defamatory meaning, fair report defences and damages: Chakravarti in the
High Court (1999) 7 Torts Law Journal 9 at 13.
4 This issue will be discussed again later in this article.
5 The observations about section 7 Wrongs Act SA are applicable to most
states in Australia, because right of reply provisions apply pursuant to
these sections: Victoria ss5(3), 5(A)(3) Wrongs Act; Queensland Defamation
Act 1889, s13(4); Western Australia, s 354 Criminal Code; Tasmania s 13(2)(b)
Defamation Act 1957; ACT s5 Defamation Act Amendment Act 1909; NT
s6(1), proviso (b) Defamation Act 1938.
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